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e have learned a great deal over the
past two decades about the princi-
pal components of the American
ﬁnancial system between 1790 and 1840—
banks, nonbank intermediaries, and the
market for corporate and government
securities.  In his paper, Richard Sylla
assesses this literature and argues for a
new interpretation of ﬁnancial develop-
ment during the early national period.  
Sylla is well qualiﬁed for the task because
he, along with collaborators, has contributed
much of what we know about the structure
and performance of the U.S. securities mar-
ket and the ﬁnances of state and local gov-
ernments before 1840.  Sylla integrates the
histories of the banking system and the capi-
tal market to better explain the broad con-
tours of early U.S. ﬁnancial development
and its impact on the nation’s growth.  In
doing so, Sylla articulates an interpretation
that informs, challenges, and stimulates
both ﬁnancial historians and students of
economic growth.
Sylla’s argument has three parts.  First,
he observes that modern scholars have
focused too heavily on the early develop-
ment of the U.S. banking system and
examined this component of the ﬁnancial
system in isolation.  The reality, he argues,
is that banks and the securities market had
close ties from early on in the United States
and grew up together.  Sylla’s second point
is that the Federalist ﬁnancial policies pro-
vided the initial impetus for interrelated
ﬁnancial development in the 1790s and
continued to support it through the early
decades of the nineteenth century.  As a
result, the United States was blessed early
on with a ﬁnancial system that rivaled the
best in Europe and surpassed all other New
World competitors.  This leads to Sylla’s
third and most important point: Economic
growth in the United States was ﬁnance-
led before 1840.
Sylla’s argument is modest in neither
goal nor scope.  He believes that U.S.
ﬁnancial-market development was rapid,
pervasive, and growth-enhancing before
1840, and that government policy was
instrumental to the process.  This big pic-
ture should stimulate renewed interest in
ﬁnancial development during the early
national period of U.S. history and will
certainly shape that investigation.  In this
comment, I offer my thoughts concerning
these future directions by considering the




Sylla’s central insight is that the devel-
opment of the U.S. banking system and that
of the securities market were closely linked
and mutually reinforcing during the early
nineteenth century.  Like many important
historical generalizations, the point seems
obvious once made—after all, Hamilton,
Gallatin, Girard, and others ﬁgure promi-
nently in historiographical treatments of
both banks and federal debt management
policies for this period.  Sylla looks beyond
the accomplishments of great men and for
the ﬁrst time clearly focuses our attention
on the functional connections between the
markets in which they participated.
Sylla (1975) alerted us two decades
ago to one element of the linkage between
banks and the securities market that was
still at work during the post–Civil War era.
He argued then that the National Banking
Act cemented correspondent relationships
between country and city banks and
effected a ﬂow of reserves from rural areas
to the New York City call loan market.  He
noted that the historical roots of this mech-
anism date back at least to the 1830s and
represent one way in which the devel-
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opment of the banking system supported
the securities market.  
Sylla (1998) is more concerned with
the opposite direction of impact—how the
development of the securities market stim-
ulated bank growth.  The point is made by
connecting two previously separate bodies
of evidence regarding ﬁnancial develop-
ment during the early national period.
The ﬁrst concerns the performance of the
securities market between 1790 and 1810.
Sylla, Wilson, and Wright (1997) have
recently shown that the market for U.S.
government securities quickly became
modern in structure and efﬁcient in perfor-
mance.  This result is important in its own
right because it expands the existing litera-
ture on historical securities-market perfor-
mance.  We already know, for example,
that American stocks were priced efﬁ-
ciently by the 1870s (Wilson and Jones
1987; Snowden 1987) and that they dis-
played “modern” patterns of returns and
volatility as far back as 1802 (Schwert
1990).  So the four results that Sylla
(1998) cites appear to extend the “early
security market efﬁciency thesis” even 
further back in time.  More to the point 
for the argument of this paper is the fact
that the market for government debt was
already deep, broad, and sophisticated as
early as the 1790s.  
A second set of facts emerges from a
re-examination of Festernmaker’s data on
U.S. banks.  Sylla is careful to point out
the warts in these numbers, as well as the
difﬁculties that arise when one compares
American and British bank capital for this
period.  Nonetheless, the results of his
analysis are persuasive and startling: U.S.
bank equity grew rapidly in the ﬁrst few
decades of the nineteenth century and by
1830 was probably twice as large as the
banking capital of England and Wales.   
Sylla draws these two generalizations
together by asking which types of ﬁnancial
assets, other than federal debt, were traded
in the precocious American securities mar-
ket.  Most important, we learn, was bank
stock—most prominently, shares of the
First Bank of the United States (BUS) and
the equity of large, state-chartered urban
banks.  Remarkably, these securities were
traded in all major regional exchanges by
1811, even though the nation’s commercial
banking sector was still in its infancy.
From this evidence, Sylla concludes that the
development of the securities market and
banks were intertwined and mutually rein-
forcing from 1790 to at least 1830.  Early in
the period, the stocks of the federal govern-
ment and the federally chartered Bank of
the United States dominated, while the 
securities market became deep, broad-based,
and efﬁcient.  State-chartered, incorporated
commercial banks then used the market to
grow rapidly.
I hope and expect that Sylla and others
will continue to reﬁne our understanding 
of the bank/securities market nexus.  Two
potential lines of inquiry strike me as partic-
ularly intriguing.  First, it is important to
assemble at least rough estimates of the
growth in banking services (loans, dis-
counts, and note issues) to complement
Sylla’s estimates of the growth in bank 
capital.  U.S. banks tended to operate at 
relatively high, and potentially variable, 
capital ratios during this period, and we 
will ultimately want to focus on variations
in the output of American banks across
space and time.  Additional data like these
will be hard to come by and, in my opinion,
are unlikely to substantially change the esti-
mates of aggregate bank growth that Sylla
(1998) presents.  These data would, how-
ever, provide a clearer picture of how widely
and deeply the beneﬁts of bank development
were distributed across the economy.
A more exhaustive analysis of bank
stock transactions would also provide better
focus on how bank development beneﬁts
were distributed across the economy.  The
evidence presented in his Table 3 success-
fully establishes Sylla’s basic point: An active
market in bank stocks was operating
between 1800 and 1820.  But this picture is
both more and less compelling than Sylla’s
discussion indicates.  On the plus side, the
bank stocks that were listed and quoted in
1811 for the Baltimore, Boston, New York
City, and Philadelphia markets include every
bank that had been chartered by 1810 in
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in these same markets not one stock was
listed from the group of 80 banks operating
outside the major money centers by this
date.  Their absence offers little support for
Sylla’s claim that the equity transactions
involving large urban banks represent only a
“tip of the iceberg” that extended to smaller
banks in smaller cities.  I doubt, moreover,
that further analysis of the ﬁnancial pages of
big city papers will change the picture very
much because the two later dates (1811 and
1817) represented in his Table 3 were both
years of very rapid bank growth as the indus-
try adjusted to the disappearance of the First
Bank of the United States and then to the
establishment of its successor (Walsh 1940,
p. 123).  
To be fair, Sylla cautions us to expect
that dealings in the equity of smaller banks
would have been more infrequent and less
publicized than those of their big-city coun-
terparts.  But we will need more evidence to
establish that the bank/securities market
connection was pervasive and not narrowly
conﬁned to major Eastern trade centers.  Per-
haps one could identify wider impacts that
resulted from the securities market dealings
of the largest banks: Did owners of smaller
institutions use these markets to diversify
their bank-related investments?  Did large
banks raise funds to subsidize the devel-
opment of their correspondents?  Alterna-
tively, one could undertake the painstaking
task of culling through the histories of
smaller bank enterprises in different regions
to construct a systematic picture of how their
equity was initially raised and how often that
equity was then traded.        
These suggestions for future work are
not intended to detract from Sylla’s accom-
plishment.  To the contrary, they reﬂect my
belief that Sylla has refocused and enlivened
the debate on ﬁnancial-market development
during the early national period by clearly
exposing the connection between banks and
the securities market.     
THE FEDERALIST FINANCIAL
REVOLUTION
Government policy plays a key role in
Sylla’s analysis and conclusions.  He argues
that modern, private ﬁnancial arrangements
emerge only if the public sector provides an
infrastructure of sound government debt
and solid monetary arrangements.  There
can be no substantial disagreement with this
general historical observation.  But ﬁnancial
development is ultimately driven by the pri-
vate sector’s real demand for intermediation
and the legal and informational constraints
that determine the types of ﬁnancial con-
tracts that can be written and enforced.  I
would have liked to have seen much more
about these inﬂuences in Sylla’s paper.  But
Sylla takes the view that the monetary and
ﬁscal arrangements chosen by the public
sector determined the pace and character
of early American ﬁnancial development.
He also asserts that the Federalist Revolu-
tion represented the critical watershed in
the process.
I cannot disagree that government
policy deserves a place at center stage.  In
1770, the colonists were still prohibited
from organizing banks and forced to seek
mercantile credit from British agents.
The American Revolution swept this
structure aside but created financial
exigencies that drove government fiscal
and monetary policies for at least a
decade.  And then, only five years after
the cessation of hostilities, a constitu-
tional convention began rewriting the
laws of the land.  These laws included the
most basic fiscal and monetary rules of
the game.  A settlement committee began
to apportion the overhanging war debt
among the state and federal governments.
By 1790, the American financial system
had endured two decades of continuous
turmoil and uncertainty in the basic
public policies that condition the private
sector’s ability to develop and implement
its own financial innovations.  
From this perspective, an obvious
achievement of the Federalist program
was a sorely needed measure of institu-
tional stability.  But Sylla seems to argue
that Hamilton’s revolution was not simply
permissive in character: Federalist poli-
cies provided a particular direction for
private-sector financial development and
were designed to accelerate the process.  IFEDERAL  RESERVE  BANK  OF  ST. LOUIS
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am ambivalent about Sylla’s position on
this last point because I have trouble fol-
lowing this part of his argument.  When
he cites Beard at some length, for exam-
ple, he endorses the idea that Hamilton
and his allies resolved a fundamental
controversy over alternative models of
financial structure in favor of the “finan-
cial, commercial and industrial classes”
who opposed “state parochialism.”  But
even though Beard clearly believed that
Hamilton was responding to specific
“interested demands” rather than general
political theories, Sylla chooses not to
identify the particular private financial
arrangements or interest groups that he
believes Hamilton had in mind.
At times in the discussion, in fact, it
appears that the Federalist program was
imposed on an environment in which no
coherent private ﬁnancial interests had
emerged.  Commercial banks had appeared
in the 1780s, but “these were isolated,
local” institutions.  And even though
private investors held and traded large
amounts of risky state and federal debt
during that decade, “there was no organized
capital market.”  These characterizations
may be historically accurate, but they pro-
vide little information about the forces that
drove ﬁnancial innovation and develop-
ment in the private sector prior to the
Federalist Revolution, however modest 
the gains may have been.
I found Sylla’s discussion of the even-
tual impacts of the Federalist program to
be much clearer.  The reason, I believe, is
that policy is directly connected here to
the bank/securities market connection dis-
cussed earlier.  Under Hamilton’s program,
the federal government funded $77 million
of securities in 1790 and 1791, or a debt
equal to 40 percent of gross domestic
product.  The taxing power of the new
constitutional government secured these
bonds, which were made even more attrac-
tive by the provision that $6 million of the
debt could be used to subscribe to the
stock of the BUS.  Together, these policies
created a much deeper and more active
securities market than would have
emerged in their absence.
FINANCE-LED ECONOMIC
GROWTH
Sylla concludes his paper with a
discussion of the most important implica-
tion of his analysis: American economic
growth was ﬁnance-led.  The argument is
appealingly simple.  He notes that attempts
to explain the onset of growth by identify-
ing a speciﬁc “leading sector” have been
tried and have generally failed.  This leads
to the possibility that all of the “real” can-
didates—cotton, factories, canals, and
railroads—were stimulated by the rapid
pace of ﬁnancial development after 1790.  
Financial historians, and I am one, are
predisposed to conclusions in which ﬁnan-
cial markets matter.  But we know, and I am
sure Sylla is aware, that it will take much
more to make the case for ﬁnance-led growth
than simply proposing it as the best, new
candidate for the role of a leading sector.
He provides no speciﬁc guidance to those
who will take up this challenge, nor will I.
For now it is enough to observe that Sylla
has identiﬁed the bank/securities market
connection as the driving force of early
American ﬁnancial development, has char-
acterized the pace at which this mechanism
worked, and has explained how it was
enhanced by government policy.  He has
given us much to think about and left us
with much work to do.
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